

# **POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS**



# Overview for 2003

U.S. Government international drug control programs made remarkable progress in 2003. Despite a “perfect storm” of conditions potentially favoring international criminal activity—the aftermath of war, violent insurgency, political turmoil, economic disruption, and endemic corruption—we further narrowed the global drug trade’s field of operations. Our long-standing, international campaign to curb the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States advanced significantly in 2003. Together with our allies we limited drug crop expansion, strengthened interdiction efforts, destroyed processing facilities, and weakened major trafficking organizations. We furnished our partners critical training assistance to strengthen their law enforcement and judicial systems, while helping them reduce drug consumption in their own countries. We persuaded many once-reluctant governments to use the powerful instrument of extradition to deny notorious drug criminals the national safe haven they could once count on. Closer cooperation among governments and financial institutions has been sealing off the loopholes that have allowed the drug trade to legitimize its enormous profits through sophisticated money laundering schemes.

## The Drug Threat

The drugs that threaten the United States are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and synthetic amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS). Cutting off their supply has been, and will continue to be, our principal international counternarcotics goal. Although U.S. consumption has been on the wane recently, cocaine remains our greatest concern. An estimated 300 metric tons or more of cocaine HCl enter the country annually, aggravating addiction, fueling crime, and harming the economic and social health of the United States. Since all cocaine originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, we have devoted a significant portion of our resources to eliminating coca cultivation, disrupting cocaine production, and keeping it from reaching the United States.

## Coca and Cocaine

Colombia leads the world in coca cultivation, with Peru and Bolivia trailing a distant second and third. Colombia is also the source of 80 percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. and other markets. Under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), in 2003 the USG devoted the lion’s share of its resources to attacking Colombian coca cultivation, while helping prevent a resurgence of coca in Peru and Bolivia. In 2003, the joint U.S.-Colombian aerial eradication program reported spraying a record 132,000 hectares of coca and nearly 3,000 hectares of opium poppy. Although USG survey data were not available at the time of publication, preliminary information suggests that the eradication program has not only contained the coca crop—an important achievement in itself—but may have brought it below last year’s first reported declining crop (144,450 hectares) in a decade.

On average, between 213 to 256 hectares of coca are required to produce a metric ton of cocaine HCl. Thus, if all coca reported as sprayed were destroyed and if there were no losses in processing, the spray program theoretically could have kept as much as 500 metric tons of cocaine from entering the system. At U.S. retail prices of \$100/gram, a metric ton of cocaine is worth \$100 million if sold gram-by-gram on the streets of America’s cities. Keeping 500 metric tons of cocaine out of the system would have deprived the criminal economy of as much as \$50 billion in 2003.

There was also encouraging news from Bolivia and Peru, for decades the two leading sources of cocaine, until eclipsed by the explosion of coca cultivation in Colombia in the 1990’s. Total coca cultivation for both countries declined from an estimated 61,000 hectares in 2002 to 59,600 hectares at the end of 2003. In Bolivia, the government forcibly eradicated most of the crop in the Chapare region, the center of the illicit Bolivian coca trade. At the same time, however, coca cultivation increased by

4,500 hectares in the Yungas region, where most of the country's traditional, legal coca is grown. It is now also becoming a source for illicit cultivation. Even so, at 28,450 hectares Bolivian cultivation levels are barely half the 52,900 hectares registered during the peak year of 1989.

Peru's coca cultivation in 2003 fell to 31,150 hectares, the lowest level since the mid-1980's when we first were able to measure illicit crops with a high degree of accuracy. This 5,450-hectare reduction in Peruvian coca more than offset the increase in Bolivia, leaving open the prospect that the total Andean coca crop may be one of the smallest in years. Since 1995, our programs have caused coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia to drop by 73 percent and 42 percent respectively. Both countries, however, face growing domestic political challenges from cocalero groups that link coca cultivation with national identity and sovereignty. These farmers' unions, often abetted by trafficking interests, promote coca cultivation and consumption as an ancient, indigenous rite that must be protected against international efforts to destroy it. With large indigenous segments of the population in both countries becoming more politically active, all countries involved can expect to face growing resistance to extensive coca eradication.

### Interdiction

On the interdiction front, 2003 was a good year. Colombia recorded especially impressive interdiction results. Colombian counternarcotics forces destroyed 83 HCl laboratories in 2003, surpassing their 2001 record of 63 HCl labs destroyed. They also captured more than 48 metric tons of cocaine/cocaine base, 1,500 metric tons of solid precursors and 750,000 gallons of liquid precursor processing chemicals. The reintroduction, in August 2003, of the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program, after a two-year hiatus because of the Peruvian shoot-down tragedy, boosted interdiction efforts. In the last four months of 2003, ABD operations resulted in the capture of three aircraft and a "go-fast" boat, the destruction of four aircraft, and the seizure of over five metric tons of cocaine.

Mexican authorities seized over 20 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride during 2003. Marijuana interdiction continued at an impressive pace, with authorities confiscating over 2,000 metric tons. In addition, authorities confiscated 165 kilograms of heroin, 189 kilograms of opium gum, and 652 kilograms of ATS drugs.

Bolivian counternarcotics forces, supported by the USG, nearly tripled cocaine seizures in 2003. At year's end, Bolivian forces had seized 152 metric tons of coca leaf, 13 metric tons of cocaine, 8.5 metric tons of cannabis, and nearly 1,100 metric tons of liquid and solid precursor and essential chemicals. In Peru, the USG helped the Peruvian government successfully identify and dismantle several international cocaine trafficking organizations responsible for maritime and air shipment of metric tons of cocaine to U.S. and European markets. In 2003, Peruvian government forces had seized approximately four metric tons of cocaine base and 3.5 metric tons of cocaine HCl.

### Opium and Heroin

Limiting the cultivation of opium poppy, the source of heroin, presents its own set of obstacles. Unlike coca, which currently flourishes in only three Andean countries, opium poppy can grow in nearly every region of the world. As an easily planted annual crop with as many as three harvests per year, it is much harder to eliminate.

Our main heroin threat comes from poppy cultivation in Colombia and Mexico. Although between them Colombia and Mexico account for only between four to six percent of the world's estimated production, the bulk of the heroin entering the United States originates in these two countries. Mexico's geographical proximity to the United States allows cultivators and processors to supply some 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. heroin market, particularly west of the Mississippi River. Colombia supplies most of the rest of country east of the Mississippi. Since eliminating poppy cultivation in

Colombia and Mexico can have a significant impact on the flow of U.S.-bound heroin, we have long-standing joint eradication programs in both countries.

Colombian law enforcement and alternative development programs eradicated 3,820 hectares of opium poppy in 2003, or 78 percent of the 2002-estimated crop. Of these, 2,821 hectares were sprayed and 1,009 hectares uprooted via forced and voluntary manual eradication programs. The 2003 cultivation and production data were not available at the time of publication, but we expect to keep the crop in check. In 2002, there were 4,900 hectares of opium poppy under annual cultivation down from 6,540 in 2001.

In Mexico, in the first 11 months of 2003, the Government of Mexico (GOM) reported eradicating almost 19,000 hectares of opium poppy. This is approximately the same annual level of opium eradication that Mexican authorities reported in 2002 and 2001. The 2003 cultivation and production data were not available at time of publication.

The other 90-plus percent of the world's estimated opium gum production takes place in Afghanistan and Burma, with Afghanistan accounting for nearly 80 percent of that figure. Each country offers unique challenges to opium poppy control. In Afghanistan, where a young government is recovering from the aftermath of war and a quarter-century of political misrule and economic chaos, poppy eradication is physically and politically difficult. Rugged terrain, and attacks by remnants of the Taliban regime present daily obstacles to the extension of government authority throughout the country.

For more than a decade, opium poppy has been Afghanistan's largest and most valuable cash crop. Taxes on the Afghan drug trade provided revenue to the Taliban regime and offered a degree of funding relief to a dysfunctional political regime that spent limited amounts on the populace. Until the final years of the regime, it ignored opium planting and used a tax on opium production and transportation and taxes on the transportation of heroin to prop up the regime. International pressure—and most likely a market glut of opium and heroin—led the Taliban to impose a poppy ban in 2000-2001, after which cultivation all but ceased. Drug stockpiles, however, continued to flow through traditional smuggling routes. Now Afghanistan has reemerged as the world's leading supplier of illicit opium, morphine, and heroin, with opium growing in 28 of the country's 32 provinces. The USG estimates the 2002-2003 crop at 61,000 hectares, nearly twice the estimate for the previous year. The International Monetary Fund calculates that the opium trade makes up between 40-60 percent of Afghanistan's GDP, with the farmers receiving approximately \$1 billion a year and another \$1.3 billion to processors and traffickers.

It is difficult to estimate precisely how much is earned from the narcotics trade and other illicit activities. The world financial community has only limited ability to track money that moves through the underground *hawala* system. However, given the street price of these drugs in Europe and further east, estimates of hundreds of millions of dollar are not out of order. Some of these proceeds may help fund elements hostile to the government of Afghanistan. Eliminating the opium crop without provoking extreme political and economic reactions poses one of the most serious drug control dilemmas the allied coalition faces.

### Synthetic Drugs

**Amphetamines.** Demand for Amphetamine-Type Stimulants, such as methamphetamine, amphetamine, and MDMA ("Ecstasy"), is high throughout both the industrialized and the developing world. Amphetamines have displaced cocaine as the stimulant of choice in many parts of the globe, primarily in Central and Northern Europe, and Southeast Asia. The relative ease and low cost of manufacturing amphetamines from readily available chemicals appeals as much to small drug entrepreneurs as to the large international syndicates. Synthetics allow individual trafficking

organizations to control the whole process, from manufacture to sale on the street. Synthetics can be made anywhere and offer enormous profit margins.

Methamphetamine is also one of the fastest-growing drug threats in the United States today. Highly effective drug trafficking organizations, based in Mexico and California, control a large percentage of the U.S. methamphetamine trade. Though Mexico is still the principal foreign supplier of methamphetamine and ATS precursors—especially pseudoephedrine (PSE)—for the United States, U.S. counternarcotics authorities assess that a portion of the PSE imported into Canada continues to be diverted to the United States for the production of illicit drugs. Since the Government of Canada enacted new regulations controlling PSE and other precursor and essential chemicals in 2002, however, the numbers of both PSE imports and seizures have declined substantially.

Methamphetamine dominates much of the drug trade in Burma and Thailand, where heroin used to be the principal trafficking drug. Methamphetamine production in the U.S. is also widespread and active, as demonstrated by DEA's National Clandestine Drug Data reporting, as of January 14, 2004, of the seizure of 8,572 methamphetamine laboratories in 2003, with the largest numbers in Missouri (968), California (788), Arkansas (607) and Tennessee (551).

**Ecstasy.** There has also been great demand globally for MDMA (Ecstasy), the amphetamine analogue 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine. Clandestine laboratories in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, remain the primary suppliers of MDMA to the international market. Labs in Poland are the primary suppliers of amphetamines to the European market, with the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries among the heaviest consumers of amphetamine. Ecstasy has also been a very popular drug in the United States, where young people use it at parties to give them stamina for hours of dancing. In 2003, however, the Monitoring the Future Study that tracks youth drug trends noted Ecstasy use has plummeted. According to the latest data, lifetime use of Ecstasy dropped 32 percent, from 8.0 percent to 5.5 percent. Past year and current use were each cut in half (from 6.1 percent to 3.1 percent and 2.4 percent to 1.1 percent). This is especially encouraging news about a drug that for years has had an upward trajectory and the potential for widespread addiction.

### **Cannabis (Marijuana)**

Cannabis (marijuana) production and consumption is a serious problem in many countries—including in the United States. More than 10,000 metric tons of domestic marijuana and more than 5,000 metric tons of marijuana is cultivated and harvested in Mexico and Canada and marketed to more than 20 million users in the United States. Colombia, Jamaica, and Paraguay also export marijuana to the U.S. The high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana, which is produced on a large scale in Canada (and has also been found within the United States), is a particular concern. This is not the “pot” of the 1970's. It is grown in laboratory conditions—with specialized timers, ventilation, moveable lights on tracks, nutrients sprayed on exposed roots and special fertilizer—all designed to maximize the THC levels in the marijuana. The resulting drug is particularly powerful, dangerous and addictive. Although in the past some have suggested that marijuana was harmless, the latest scientific information indicates that marijuana produces withdrawal symptoms and is associated with learning and memory disturbances.

### **Attacking Trafficking Organizations.**

Drug distribution depends upon well-organized, sophisticated trafficking organizations. Our common strategy targets the leadership of the main trafficking groups, focusing on the operations along the network that bring drugs to the United States. Working with our international counterparts, our goal is not simply disruption, but the eventual dismantling of these organizations—their leadership, the facilitators who launder money and provide the chemicals needed for the production of illicit drugs, and their networks. In addition to hampering the organizations' effectiveness, capturing key traffickers

demonstrates—to the criminals and to the governments fighting them alike—that even the most powerful drug syndicates are vulnerable to joint action by U.S. and host-government authorities.

Mexican drug syndicates oversee much of the drug trafficking in the United States. They have a strong presence in most of the primary distribution centers in the United States, directing the movement of cocaine, heroin, ATS drugs, and marijuana. In 2003, U.S. and Mexican officials developed a common targeting plan against major drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and the United States and developed secure mechanisms for data-sharing. Mexican Federal enforcement and military authorities damaged several important trafficking syndicates. They arrested, among others, senior figures in the Juarez cartel, the head of the Milenio cartel of Michoacán, and the leaders of the trafficking group that controlled large-scale cocaine and cannabis trafficking through the Matamoros-Brownsville, Texas, smuggling corridor, as well as high-ranking members of other drug syndicates.

### **Institutional Reform**

A long-standing element of our international drug control policy has been to encourage and assist governments to strengthen their judicial and banking systems to narrow the opportunities for their manipulation by the drug trade. In drug source and transit countries, law enforcement agencies have arrested prominent traffickers, only to see them walk free following a seemingly frivolous or inexplicable decision by a single judge. But the situation is gradually changing. In 2003, a number of countries continued to modernize their laws and professionalize their court systems through reforms ranging from installing more modern equipment to major changes in the way judges are appointed. Though there are still instances of judges arbitrarily dismissing evidence against or releasing well-known drug traffickers, the number of such cases is declining, as governments make basic reforms, such as giving judges better pay and greater personal protection.

### **Extradition**

In 2003, the United States continued to encourage other countries to facilitate extradition to the United States, the sanction the drug trade and terrorist organizations fear most. The array of notorious drug criminals serving long prison terms in the U.S. is a sober reminder to even the most powerful cartel leaders of what can happen when they can no longer manipulate the judicial process through bribes and intimidation. Though the laws of several countries still prohibit the extradition of their nationals, that situation is changing, as governments fighting the drug trade realize the power of extradition. The number of drug-related extraditions to the U.S. from Colombia and Mexico has increased dramatically. In 2003, the Colombian government extradited 64 Colombian nationals and 4 others to the U.S., a 70 percent jump over the previous year's number. Mexico extradited 31 fugitives to the United States in 2003, up from a record 25 extraditions to the U.S. in 2002. However, the 2001 Mexican Supreme Court decision prohibiting extradition in cases with a potential life sentence remains an important obstacle to the extradition of some major drug traffickers and other criminals. In August 2003, the U.S. Senate ratified a major revision of the 1899 extradition treaty with Peru expanding the number of offenses subject to extradition and closing one more avenue for traffickers targeted by the United States.

### **Controlling Drug Processing Chemicals**

Cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs cannot be manufactured without certain critical chemicals, many of which are subject to governmental control. Cocaine and heroin refining operations generally require widely available “essential chemicals.” Substitutes for unavailable chemicals can be used for most of the chemicals used in the manufacturing process, but there are some indispensable chemicals—potassium permanganate for cocaine and acetic anhydride for heroin—for which there are few easily

obtainable substitutes. Synthetic drug manufacture requires even more specific “precursor chemicals,” such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine. These chemicals, used mainly for pharmaceutical purposes, have important but specific legitimate uses. They are commercially traded in smaller quantities to discrete users. Governments must, therefore, have efficient legal and regulatory regimes to control such chemicals, without placing undue burdens on legitimate commerce. The United States, other major chemical trading countries, and the UN’s International Narcotics Control Board worked in 2003 to improve controls on cocaine and heroin processing chemicals, and those used for manufacturing synthetic drugs.

Bilaterally, we worked closely with the Canadian government in 2003 to curtail the diversion of drug processing chemicals to criminal interests in the United States. Pseudoephedrine (PSE), a common cold remedy and the main component in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, is legally imported into Canada from China, India, and Germany. U.S. counternarcotics authorities assess that a portion of those imports is diverted to the United States for the production of illicit drugs. Other precursor chemicals available in Canada and used in the production of synthetic drugs are sassafras oil, piperonal, and gamma butyrolactone (GBL). These precursors are used in the manufacturing of Ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA), methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA), and gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB). Precursor smuggling from Canada, however, declined in 2003. New Canadian chemical control regulations, which became effective in January 2003, combined with a major bilateral enforcement operation, Northern Star, may be having an impact on chemical diversion from Canada to the United States. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that illicit PSE seizure rates of 8.8 million tablets from Canada as of September 15, 2003, were significantly lower than the 22 million tablets intercepted in 2002.

### Controlling Supply

Our objective is to reduce and ultimately cut off the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. We target drug supply at critical points along a five-point grower-to-user chain that links the consumer in the United States to the grower in a source country. In the case of cocaine or heroin, the chain begins with the growers cultivating coca or opium poppies, for instance, in the Andes or Afghanistan. It ends with the cocaine or heroin user in a U.S. town or city. The intermediate links are the processing (drug refining), transit (transport), and wholesale distribution stages.

Our international counternarcotics programs target the first three links of the grower-to-user chain: cultivation, processing, and transit. The closer we can attack to the source, the greater the likelihood of halting the flow of drugs altogether. Crop control is by far the most cost-effective means of cutting supply. If we destroy crops or force them to remain unharvested, no drugs will enter the system. It is the equivalent of removing a malignant growth before it can spread uncontrollably into the rest of the system. Theoretically, with no drug crops to harvest, no cocaine or heroin could enter the distribution chain; nor would there be any need for costly enforcement and interdiction operations.

But theory inevitably clashes with the economic and political exigencies of the real world. Massive (aerial and chemical) eradication is not legal in many countries. Even if eradication is feasible, destroying a lucrative crop, even an illegal one, carries enormous political, economic and social ramifications for the producing country. It means attacking the livelihood of a large—and often the poorest—sector of the population. Democratic governments that take away vital income without any quid pro quo seldom survive for long. Developing, implementing, and reaping the benefits of viable, long-term alternatives for the affected population can take decades. Therefore, we also focus upon the subsequent links: the processing and distribution stages of laboratory destruction and interdiction of drug shipments.

Our programs require the flexibility to shift resources to those links where we can achieve both an immediate impact and long-term results. As our experience over the past few years in Peru and Bolivia



has demonstrated, the right combination of effective law enforcement actions and alternative development programs can deliver truly remarkable results. We work closely with the governments of the coca-growing countries to find the best way to eliminate illegal coca within the context of each country's unique situation—a difficult task given the high price of coca and generally depressed markets for many replacement crops. Alternative development programs play a vital role in countries seeking to liberate important parts of their agricultural sector from reliance on the drug trade. They offer farmers opportunities to abandon illegal activities and become part of the legitimate economy. In the Andean region, these programs provide funds and technical assistance to strengthen public and private institutions, expand rural infrastructure; improve natural resources management, introduce alternative legal crops, and develop local and international markets for these products.

Despite a host of obstacles, alternative development programs in Colombia were responsible for the manual eradication of more than 8,400 hectares of coca and 900 hectares of poppy in 2003. In Peru, the programs focused on rehabilitating 170 kilometers of highway and bridges to improve market access for isolated communities. In Bolivia, they created employment alternatives for 25,000 families formerly raising coca in the Chapare. Over a two-year period, these families' annual farm family income has risen, and crop yields have increased by approximately 25 percent. In Ecuador, the northern border area alternative development projects led to the construction of 30 potable water systems, land titling initiatives for farmers; and support for indigenous communities. Though the full impact of many alternative development programs will not be felt for years, progress to date suggests that eventually legitimate, economically viable agriculture can replace today's illicit cultivation.

### **Illegal Drugs, Spraying, and the Environment**

Sooner or later, questions arise over the environmental risks of regular spraying of illegal drug crops. Colombia is at this time the only country that allows regular aerial spraying of coca and opium poppy. The Colombian government has authorized the herbicide that is being used to conduct aerial eradication in the growing areas. The only active ingredient in the herbicide used in the aerial eradication program is glyphosate, one of the most widely used agricultural herbicides in the world. It has been tested widely in the United States, Colombia, and elsewhere in the world. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved glyphosate for general use in 1974 and re-registered it in September 1993. EPA has approved its use on food croplands, forests, residential areas, and around aquatic areas. It is one of the top five pesticides, including herbicides, used in the United States.

### **Environmental Consequences of Illicit Coca Cultivation**

One must weigh the environmental impact of approved herbicides against the devastating potential of all aspects of coca cultivation. Over more than two decades, coca cultivation in the Andean region has led to the destruction of approximately six million acres of rainforest. Working in remote areas beyond settled populations, coca growers routinely slash and burn virgin forestland to make way for their illegal crops. Tropical rains quickly erode the thin topsoil of the fields, increasing soil runoff, depleting soil nutrients, and, by destroying timber and other resources that would otherwise be available for more sustainable uses, decreasing biological diversity. The destructive cycle continues as growers regularly abandon non-productive parcels to prepare new plots. At the same time, traffickers destroy jungle forests to build clandestine landing strips and laboratories for processing raw coca and poppy into cocaine and heroin.

Illicit coca growers frequently are negligent in their use of fertilizers and pesticides. Largely ignorant about the consequences of indiscriminate use of strong chemicals, they dump large quantities of highly toxic herbicides and fertilizers on their crops. These chemicals include paraquat and endosulfan, both

of which qualify under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's highest classification for toxicity (Category I) and are legally restricted for sale within Colombia and the United States.

Most destructive are the toxic chemicals that are used at each stage of cocaine production. USG studies conducted in the early 1990s in Bolivia and Peru indicated that one kilogram of cocaine base required the use of three liters of concentrated sulfuric acid, 10 kilos of lime, 60 to 80 liters of kerosene, 200 grams of potassium permanganate, and one liter of concentrated ammonia. These toxic pesticides, fertilizers, and processing chemicals are then dumped into the nearest waterway or on the ground. They saturate the soil and contaminate waterways, poisoning water systems and dependent species in the process.

### **The Battle against Corruption**

Fighting the drug trade is a dominant element in a broader struggle against corruption. Drug organizations possess and wield the ultimate instrument of corruption: money. The drug trade has access to almost unimaginable quantities of it. No commodity is so widely available, so cheap to produce and so easily renewable as illegal drugs. They offer enormous profit margins that allow the drug trade to generate criminal revenues on a scale without historical precedent. For example, assuming an average U.S. retail street price of one hundred dollars a gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine is worth \$100 million on the streets of the United States; twice as much if the drug is cut with additives. That same metric ton typically would have cost around \$3,000,000 (\$3,000 per kilogram) when it left Colombia. Few legitimate businesses can boast of a 30-fold return. At \$100 per gram, the approximately 100 metric tons of cocaine that the USG typically seizes each year could theoretically be worth as much as \$10 billion to the drug trade—more than the gross domestic product of some countries. Even if only a portion of these profits flows back to the drug syndicates, we are nonetheless speaking of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars.

To put the scale of these sums into perspective, in FY 2004 the State Department's budget for international drug control operations was approximately \$1.01 billion. That equates to roughly 10 metric tons of cocaine. The drug syndicates have lost that amount in a single shipment, with the only immediate consequence to the drug trade being the punishment of those responsible for the loss.

Though corruption may be a much less obvious threat than the challenge of armed insurgents, the weakening of government institutions through bribery and intimidation potentially poses just as great a danger to democratic governments. Guerrilla armies or terrorist organizations openly seek to topple and replace governments through overt violence. The drug syndicates, however, seek to undermine governments covertly to guarantee themselves a secure operating environment. They do so by co-opting key officials. A real fear of democratic leaders should be that one day the drug trade might take de facto control of a country by essentially buying off a majority of key officials, even the president. With a government secretly on its payroll, a criminal organization has an open field ahead of it. Though such a scenario has yet to happen, in the recent past there have been some close calls. By keeping the focus on eliminating corruption, we can prevent the nightmare of a government entirely manipulated by drug lords from becoming a reality.

### **Next Steps**

Successfully confronting the international drug trade is a complex, dynamic process that does not get easier over time. The drug trade is nothing if not resilient. It learns quickly from its mistakes. Every year, natural selection leaves us with a slightly more astute adversary. Our successes force it to become smarter and more sophisticated in order to survive. We have seen this already in the difficulty

of targeting the hundreds of small, hard-to-target drug syndicates that filled the void left by the destruction of Colombia's two dominant cartels.

Yet the drug trade is far from omnipotent. It is vulnerable on many fronts. It needs raw materials to produce drugs, complex logistics arrangements to move them to their destination, cadres of professionals to run the technical and financial aspects of its operations, and some means of making its profits legitimate. Above all, it needs the protection of a reliable core of corrupt officials in all the countries along its distribution chain.

Unrelenting attacks at all of these vulnerable points keep the drug trade on the defensive. Step by step we have methodically hurt the drug trade at every stage. The media often overlook the day-to-day accomplishments of governments and law enforcement agencies against the drug trade. The regular drug seizures, the steady destruction of jungle drug labs and airstrips, the arrests of corrupt officials, and the improved performance of better trained police and judiciaries seldom make the front page. But these are the crucial, daily victories that are the key to success. Our experience has shown that cumulative effort and sustained cooperation with committed allies pay off. They are the weapons that ultimately will weaken the drug trade to the point where it no longer poses a serious threat to the security or health of the United States and its allies.

## **Demand Reduction**

Drug "demand reduction" refers to efforts to reduce worldwide use and abuse of, and demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The need for demand reduction is a fundamental and critical part of controlling the illicit drug trade. Escalating drug use and abuse continue to take a devastating toll on the health, welfare, safety, security, and economic stability of all nations. Recognizing this problem, the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD#25) on International Drug Control Policy addressed rising global demand for illicit drugs as the principal narcotics-related threat to the U.S. A key objective of that policy urged the Secretary of State to expand U.S. international demand reduction assistance and information sharing programs in key source and transit countries. The NSPD also noted that international drug trafficking organizations and their linkage to international terrorist organizations constitutes a serious threat to U.S. national security. Demand reduction efforts aimed at reducing worldwide drug consumption therefore took on increased importance and served the national interest due to its potential for reducing the income that criminal and terrorist organizations derive from narcotics trafficking and for reducing crime/strengthening security in foreign countries that are key strategic allies of the United States.

Foreign countries are requesting technical and other assistance from the USG to address their problems, citing long-term U.S. experience and efforts on this issue. Our response has been a comprehensive and coordinated approach in which supply control and demand reduction reinforce each other. Such assistance plays an important role in helping to preserve the stability of societies threatened by the narcotics trade.

Our demand reduction strategy encompasses a wide range of initiatives. These include efforts to prevent the onset of use, intervention at "critical decision points" in the lives of vulnerable populations to prevent both first use and further use, and effective treatment programs for the addicted. Other aspects encompass education and media campaigns to increase public awareness of the deleterious consequences of drug use/abuse and community-coalition building. This latter effort involves the development of coalitions of private/public social institutions, the faith community, and law enforcement entities to mobilize national and international opinion against the drug trade and to encourage governments to develop and implement strong counternarcotics policies and programs. The demand reduction program also provides for evaluations of the effectiveness of these efforts and for

“best practice” research studies to use these findings to improve similar services provided in the U.S. and around the world.

In 2003, INL funded bilateral training at various locations throughout the world on topics such as community/grassroots coalition building and networking, U.S. policies and programs, science-based drug prevention programming, and treatment within the criminal justice system. INL training enhanced Muslim-based networks of counternarcotics/civil society organizations. This involved collaboration with Muslim faith-based organizations to augment prevention, intervention, aftercare and violence reduction services in Afghanistan, southern Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan. INL also continued to sponsor sub-regional demand reduction training in Brazil, Colombia, the Czech Republic and Southeast Asia. In September, INL co-sponsored with the Government of Italy the 5th Global Drug Prevention Network (GDPN) summit in Pomizia, Italy. The purpose of the summit was to develop an enhanced communications system for coordinating the participation of 7,000 drug prevention organizations from over 70 countries.

INL funded comprehensive multi-year scientific studies on pilot projects and programs developed from INL-funded training to learn how these initiatives can help assist U.S.-based demand reduction efforts. Three comprehensive research best practice studies that documented effective treatment approaches, strategies, policies and technologies were completed in 2003. Research on prevention programs in selected Latin American countries that have developed promising prevention and antiviolence modalities from INL-funded training will be completed in 2004.

## Methodology for Estimating Illegal Drug Production

**How Much Do We Know?** The INCSR contains a variety of illicit drug-related data. These numbers represent the United States Government’s best effort to sketch the current dimensions of the international drug problem. Some numbers are more certain than others. Drug cultivation figures are relatively hard data derived by proven means, such as imagery with ground truth confirmation. Other numbers, such as crop production and drug yield estimates, become softer as more variables come into play. As we do every year, we publish these data with an important caveat: the yield figures are potential, not final numbers. Although they are useful for determining trends, even the best are ultimately approximations.

Each year, we revise our estimates in the light of field research. The clandestine, violent nature of the illegal drug trade makes such field research difficult. Geography is also an impediment, as the harsh terrain on which many drugs are cultivated is not always easily accessible. This is particularly relevant given the tremendous geographic areas that must be covered, and the difficulty of collecting reliable information over diverse and treacherous terrain.

**What We Know With Reasonable Certainty.** Cultivation—the number of hectares under cultivation during any given year—is our most solid statistic. For nearly twenty years, the United States Government has estimated the extent of illicit cultivation in a dozen nations using proven statistical methods similar to those used to estimate the size of licit crops at home and abroad. We can therefore estimate the extent of cultivation with reasonable accuracy.

**What We Know With Less Certainty..** How much of a finished product a given area will produce is difficult to estimate. Small changes in factors such as soil fertility, weather, farming techniques, and disease can produce widely varying results from year to year and place to place. To add to our uncertainty, most illicit drug crop areas are not easily accessible to the United States Government, making scientific information difficult to obtain. Therefore, we are estimating the potential crop

available for harvest. Not all of these estimates allow for losses, which could represent up to a third or more of a crop in some areas for some harvests. The value in estimating the size of the potential crop is to provide a consistent basis for a comparative analysis from year to year.

**Harvest Estimates.** We have gradually improved our yield estimates. Our confidence in coca leaf yield estimates, as well as in the finished product, has risen in the past few years, based upon the results of field studies conducted in Latin America. In all cases, however, multiplying average yields times available hectares indicates only the potential, not the actual final drug crop available for harvest. The size of the harvest depends upon the efficiency of farming practices and the wastage caused by poor practices or difficult weather conditions during and after harvest. Up to a third or more of a crop may be lost in some areas during harvests.

In addition, mature coca (two to six years old) is more productive than immature or aging coca. Variations such as these can dramatically affect potential yield and production. Additional information and analysis is allowing us to make adjustments for these factors. Similar deductions for local consumption of unprocessed coca leaf and opium may be possible as well through the accumulation of additional information and research.

**Processing Estimates.** The wide variation in processing efficiency achieved by traffickers complicates the task of estimating the quantity of cocaine or heroin that could be refined from a crop. Differences in the origin and quality of the raw material used, the technical processing method employed, the size and sophistication of laboratories, the skill and experience of local workers and chemists, and decisions made in response to enforcement pressures obviously affect production.. (See the various INCSR chapters for specific information.)

**Figures Change as Techniques and Data Quality Improve.** Each year, research produces revisions to United States Government estimates of potential drug production. This is typical of annualized figures for most other areas of statistical tracking that must be revised year to year, whether it be the size of the U.S. wheat crop, population figures, or the unemployment rate. For the present, these illicit drug statistics represent the state of the art. As new information becomes available and as the art improves, so will the precision of the estimates.

## Status of Potential Worldwide Production

The yield figures in the INCSR are theoretical. They are estimates of potential production—the quantities that the United States Government estimates could have been produced if, and only if, all available crops were to be converted into finished drugs. These estimates do not always make allowance for losses, so actual production is probably lower than our estimates. The figures shown are mean points in a statistical range.

**Potential Opium Production.** In Southeast Asia, opium poppy cultivation and potential opium production decreased dramatically in 2003. The cultivated area fell 36 percent to 66,030 hectares from 102,650 hectares the previous year. Potential opium gum production fell 17 percent to 684 metric tons from 829 metric tons in 2003. If all the opium gum were processed, this quantity could yield approximately 65 metric tons of heroin,

Opium poppy cultivation nearly doubled in Southwest Asia in 2003, with the bulk of the crop now cultivated in Afghanistan. The year-end total was 61,000 hectares of opium poppy, potentially yielding 2,865 metric tons of opium gum or 337 metric tons of heroin.

In the Western Hemisphere, the opium poppy growing countries have maintained active crop control efforts. Data for 2003 were not available at the time of publication for Colombia or Mexico. Though no specific data was available, there are reports of opium poppy expansion in Peru.

**Coca Cultivation.** Worldwide coca cultivation figures were not available at time of publication, since the annual survey for Colombia, the largest producer, was not complete. It is likely, however, the 2003 crop will be smaller than last year's total of 144,450 hectares. In Bolivia, there were 28,450 hectares of coca detected. Because of weather conditions, surveys in Bolivia now cover the period June-June, rather than January-December. Peru's coca crop dropped from 36,600 hectares at the end of 2002 to 31,150 hectares in 2003. It is likely that there is coca in inaccessible areas of Brazil, but its extent is unknown. Ecuador has negligible amounts of coca.

### **Cocaine Field Estimates**

The cocaine yield figure is offered with the same caveat as the crop harvest yield data: it is a figure representing potential production. It does not in every case allow for losses or the many other variables that one would encounter in a "real world" conversion from plant to finished drug. In fact, the amount of cocaine HCl actually making it to market is probably lower. Efficiencies vary greatly from country to country.

The United States Government estimates that in 2002, 680 metric tons of cocaine were potentially available from Colombia, 140 metric tons from Peru and 60 metric tons potentially available from Bolivia. Figures for 2003 were not available at publication time.

### **Consumption Data**

Most of the chapters in this report contain some user or consumption data. For the most part, these are estimates provided by foreign governments or informal estimates by United States Government agencies. There is no way to vouch for their reliability. They are included because they are the only data available and give an approximation of how governments view their own drug abuse problems. They should not be considered as a source of data to develop any reliable consumption estimates.

### **Marijuana Production**

According to USG estimates, net marijuana production in Mexico in 2002 was 7,900 metric tons of cannabis from 4,900 hectares of cultivation. Figures for 2003 were not available at the time of publication. In Colombia's traditional cannabis growing zones, cultivation is estimated to be about 4,000 hectares. We recognize that there may be considerable amounts of undetected cannabis cultivation in Central and East Asia, and on the African continent, though there is no evidence that any of this cannabis significantly affects the United States. As we gather more accurate information, we will report significant findings in future INCSRs.

## *Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation*

### 1996–2003 (All Figures in Hectares)

	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996
<b>Opium</b>								
Afghanistan	61,000	30,750	1,685	64,510	51,500	41,720	39,150	37,950
India							2,050	3,100
Iran								
Pakistan		622	213	515	1,570	3,030	4,100	3,400
<b>Total SW Asia</b>	<b>61,000</b>	<b>31,372</b>	<b>1,898</b>	<b>65,025</b>	<b>53,070</b>	<b>44,750</b>	<b>45,300</b>	<b>44,450</b>
Burma	47,130	78,000	105,000	108,700	89,500	130,300	155,150	163,100
China								
Laos	18,900	23,200	22,000	23,150	21,800	26,100	28,150	25,250
Thailand		750	820	890	835	1,350	1,650	2,170
Vietnam		1,000	2,300	2,300	2,100	3,000	6,150	3,150
<b>Total SE Asia</b>	<b>66,030</b>	<b>102,950</b>	<b>130,120</b>	<b>135,040</b>	<b>114,235</b>	<b>160,750</b>	<b>191,100</b>	<b>193,670</b>
Colombia		6,500	6,500	7,500	7,500	6,100	6,600	6,300
Lebanon								90
Guatemala								
Mexico		2,700	4,400	1,900	3,600	5,500	4,000	5,100
<b>Total Other</b>		<b>9,200</b>	<b>10,900</b>	<b>9,400</b>	<b>11,100</b>	<b>11,600</b>	<b>10,600</b>	<b>11,490</b>
<b>Total Opium</b>	<b>127,030</b>	<b>143,522</b>	<b>142,918</b>	<b>209,465</b>	<b>178,405</b>	<b>217,100</b>	<b>247,000</b>	<b>249,610</b>
<b>Coca</b>								
Bolivia <sup>1</sup>	28,450	24,400	19,900	14,600	21,800	38,000	45,800	48,100
Colombia		144,450	169,800	136,200	122,500	101,800	79,500	67,200
Peru	31,150	36,600	34,000	34,200	38,700	51,000	68,800	94,400
Ecuador								
<b>Total Coca</b>	<b>59,600</b>	<b>205,450</b>	<b>223,700</b>	<b>185,000</b>	<b>183,000</b>	<b>190,800</b>	<b>194,100</b>	<b>209,700</b>
<b>Cannabis</b>								
Mexico		3,900	3,900	3,900	3,700	4,600	4,800	6,500
Colombia	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Jamaica							317	527
<b>Total Cannabis</b>	<b>5,000</b>	<b>8,900</b>	<b>8,900</b>	<b>8,900</b>	<b>8,700</b>	<b>9,600</b>	<b>10,117</b>	<b>12,027</b>

<sup>1</sup> Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.

# Worldwide Illicit Drug Cultivation

1988–1995 (All Figures in Hectares)

	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988
<b>Opium</b>								
Afghanistan	38,740	29,180	21,080	19,470	17,190	12,370	18,650	23,000
India	4,750	5,500	4,400					
Iran								
Pakistan	6,950	7,270	6,280	8,170	8,205	8,220	6,050	11,588
<b>Total SW Asia</b>	<b>50,440</b>	<b>41,950</b>	<b>31,760</b>	<b>27,640</b>	<b>25,395</b>	<b>20,590</b>	<b>24,700</b>	<b>34,588</b>
Burma	154,070	154,070	146,600	153,700	160,000	150,100	143,000	104,200
China	1,275	1,965						
Laos	19,650	19,650	18,520	25,610	29,625	30,580	42,130	40,400
Thailand	1,750	2,110	2,110	2,050	3,000	3,435	4,075	2,843
<b>Total SE Asia</b>		<b>177,795</b>	<b>167,230</b>	<b>181,360</b>	<b>192,625</b>	<b>184,185</b>	<b>189,205</b>	<b>147,443</b>
Colombia	<b>176,745</b>				1,160			
Lebanon	6,540	20,000	20,000	20,000	3,400	3,200	4,500	na
Guatemala	150		440	na	1,145	845	1,220	710
Mexico	39	50	438	730	3,765	5,450	6,600	5,001
Vietnam	5,050	5,795	3,960	3,310				
<b>Total Other</b>	<b>11,779</b>	<b>25,845</b>	<b>24,838</b>	<b>24,040</b>	<b>9,470</b>	<b>9,495</b>	<b>12,320</b>	<b>5,711</b>
<b>Total Opium</b>	<b>238,964</b>	<b>245,590</b>	<b>223,828</b>	<b>233,040</b>	<b>227,490</b>	<b>214,200</b>	<b>226,225</b>	<b>187,742</b>
<b>Coca</b>								
Bolivia	48,600	48,100	47,200	45,500	47,900	50,300	52,900	48,900
Colombia	50,900	45,000	39,700	37,100	37,500	40,100	42,400	34,000
Peru	115,300	108,600	108,800	129,100	120,800	121,300	120,400	110,400
Ecuador					40	120	150	240
<b>Total Coca</b>	<b>214,800</b>	<b>201,700</b>	<b>195,700</b>	<b>211,700</b>	<b>206,240</b>	<b>211,820</b>	<b>215,850</b>	<b>193,540</b>
<b>Cannabis</b>								
Mexico	6,900	10,550	11,220	16,420	17,915	35,050	53,900	5,003
Colombia	5,000	4,986	5,000	2,000	2,000	1,500	2,270	4,188
Jamaica	305	308	744	389	950	1,220	280	607
<b>Total Cannabis</b>	<b>12,205</b>	<b>15,844</b>	<b>16,964</b>	<b>18,809</b>	<b>20,865</b>	<b>37,770</b>	<b>56,450</b>	<b>9,798</b>



# Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production

## 1996–2003 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996
<b>Opium Gum</b>								
Afghanistan	2,865	1,278	74	3,656	2,861	2,340	2,184	2,174
India							30	47
Iran								
Pakistan		5	5	11	37	66	85	75
<b>Total SW Asia</b>	<b>2,865</b>	<b>1,283</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>3,667</b>	<b>2,898</b>	<b>2,406</b>	<b>2,299</b>	<b>2,296</b>
Burma	484	630	865	1,085	1,090	1,750	2,365	2,560
China								
Laos	200	180	200	210	140	140	210	200
Thailand		9	6	6	6	16	25	30
Vietnam		10	15	15	11	20	45	25
<b>Total SE Asia</b>	<b>684</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>1,086</b>	<b>1,316</b>	<b>1,247</b>	<b>1,926</b>	<b>2,645</b>	<b>2,815</b>
Colombia					75	61	66	63
Lebanon								1
Guatemala								
Mexico		47	71	21	43	60	46	54
<b>Total Other</b>		<b>47</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Total Opium</b>	<b>3,549</b>	<b>2,159</b>	<b>1,236</b>	<b>5,004</b>	<b>4,263</b>	<b>4,453</b>	<b>5,056</b>	<b>4,285</b>
<b>Coca Leaf</b>								
Bolivia <sup>1</sup>	17,210	19,800	20,200	26,800	22,800	52,900	70,100	75,100
Colombia <sup>2</sup>				583,000	521,400	437,600	347,000	302,900
Peru		52,700	52,600	54,400	69,200	95,600	130,200	174,700
Ecuador								
<b>Total Coca<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>17,210</b>	<b>72,500</b>	<b>72,800</b>	<b>664,200</b>	<b>613,400</b>	<b>586,100</b>	<b>547,300</b>	<b>552,700</b>
<b>Cannabis</b>								
Mexico		7,900	7,400	7,000	3,700	8,300	8,600	11,700
Colombia		4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,133	4,133
Jamaica							214	356
Belize								
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500
<b>Total Cannabis</b>	<b>3,500</b>	<b>15,400</b>	<b>14,900</b>	<b>14,500</b>	<b>11,200</b>	<b>15,800</b>	<b>16,447</b>	<b>19,689</b>

<sup>1</sup> Beginning in 2001, USG surveys of Bolivian coca take place cover the period June to June.

<sup>2</sup> Since leaf calculation is by fresh leaf weight in Colombia, in contrast to dry weight elsewhere, these boxes are blank.

<sup>3</sup> 2002 and 2001 totals do not include Colombia. See footnote 2 above.

## *Worldwide Potential Illicit Drug Production*

### 1988–1995 (All Figures in Metric Tons)

	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991	1990	1989	1988
<b>Opium Gum</b>								
Afghanistan	1,250	950	685	640	570	415	585	750
India	77	90						
Iran								
Pakistan	155	160	140	175	180	165	130	205
<b>Total SW Asia</b>	<b>1,482</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>825</b>	<b>815</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>715</b>	<b>955</b>
Burma	2,340	2,030	2,575	2,280	2,350	2,255	2,430	1,280
China	19	25						
Laos	180	85	180	230	265	275	380	255
Thailand	25	17	42	24	35	40	50	25
Vietnam								
<b>Total SE Asia</b>	<b>2,564</b>	<b>2,157</b>	<b>2,797</b>	<b>2,534</b>	<b>2,650</b>	<b>2,570</b>	<b>2,860</b>	<b>1,560</b>
Colombia	65							
Lebanon	1		4		34	32	45	
Guatemala					11	13	12	8
Mexico	53	60	49	40	41	62	66	67
<b>Total Other</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Total Opium</b>	<b>4,165</b>	<b>3,417</b>	<b>3,675</b>	<b>3,389</b>	<b>3,486</b>	<b>3,257</b>	<b>3,698</b>	<b>2,590</b>
<b>Coca Leaf</b>								
Bolivia	85,000	89,800	84,400	80,300	78,000	77,000	78,200	79,500
Colombia	229,300	35,800	31,700	29,600	30,000	32,100	33,900	27,200
Peru	183,600	165,300	155,500	223,900	222,700	196,900	186,300	187,700
Ecuador			100	100	40	170	270	400
<b>Total Coca</b>	<b>497,900</b>	<b>290,900</b>	<b>271,700</b>	<b>333,900</b>	<b>330,740</b>	<b>306,170</b>	<b>298,670</b>	<b>294,800</b>
<b>Cannabis</b>								
Mexico	12,400	5,540	6,280	7,795	7,775	19,715	30,200	5,655
Colombia	4,133	4,138	4,125	1,650	1,650	1,500	2,800	7,775
Jamaica	206	208	502	263	641	825	190	405
Belize					49	60	65	120
Others	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500	3,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,239</b>	<b>13,386</b>	<b>14,407</b>	<b>13,208</b>	<b>13,615</b>	<b>25,600</b>	<b>36,755</b>	<b>17,455</b>

## *Parties to the 1988 UN Convention*

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
1. Afghanistan	20 December 1988	14 February 1992
2. Albania	Accession	27 June 2001
3. Algeria	20 December 1988	5 May 1995
4. Andorra	Accession	23 July 1999
5. Antigua and Barbuda	Accession	5 April 1993
6. Argentina	Accession	13 September 1993
7. Armenia	20 December 1988	28 June 1993
8. Australia	14 February 1989	16 November 1992
9. Austria	25 September 1989	11 July 1997
10. Azerbaijan	Accession	22 September 1993
11. Bahamas	20 December 1988	30 January 1989
12. Bahrain	28 September 1989	7 February 1990
13. Bangladesh	14 April 1989	11 October 1990
14. Barbados	Accession	15 October 1992
15. Belarus	27 February 1989	15 October 1990
16. Belgium	22 May 1989	25 October 1995
17. Belize	Accession	24 July 1996
18. Benin	Accession	23 May 1997
19. Bhutan	Accession	27 August 1990
20. Bolivia	20 December 1988	20 August 1990
21. Bosnia and Herzegovina	Succession	01 September 1993
22. Botswana	Accession	13 August 1996
23. Brazil	20 December 1988	17 July 1991
24. Brunei Darussalam	26 October 1989	12 November 1993
25. Bulgaria	19 May 1989	24 September 1992
26. Burkina Faso	Accession	02 June 1992
27. Burma	Ratified	11 June 1991
28. Burundi	Accession	18 February 1993
29. Cameroon	27 February 1989	28 October 1991
30. Canada	20 December 1988	05 July 1990
31. Cape Verde	Accession	08 May 1995

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
32. Central African Republic	Accession	15 October 2001
33. Chad	Accession	09 June 1995
34. Chile	20 December 1988	13 March 1990
35. China	20 December 1988	25 October 1989
36. Colombia	20 December 1988	10 June 1994
37. Comoros	Accession	1 March 2000
38. Costa Rica	25 April 1989	8 February 1991
39. Cote d'Ivoire	20 December 1988	25 November 1991
40. Croatia	Succession	26 July 1993
41. Cuba	7 April 1989	12 June 1996
42. Cyprus	20 December 1988	25 May 1990
43. Czech Republic	Succession	30 December 1993
44. Denmark	20 December 1988	19 December 1991
45. Djibouti	Accession	22 February 2001
46. Dominica	Accession	30 June 1993
47. Dominican Republic	Accession	21 September 1993
48. Ecuador	21 June 1988	23 March 1990
49. Egypt	20 December 1988	15 March 1991
50. El Salvador	Accession	21 May 1993
51. Estonia	Accession	12 July 2000
52. Ethiopia	Accession	11 October 1994
53. European Economic Community	8 June 1989	31 December 1990
54. Fiji	Accession	25 March 1993
55. Finland	8 February 1989	15 February 1994
56. France	13 February 1989	31 December 1990
57. Gambia	Accession	23 April 1996
58. Germany	19 January 1989	30 November 1993
59. Georgia	Accession	8 January 1998
60. Ghana	20 December 1988	10 April 1990
61. Greece	23 February 1989	28 January 1992
62. Grenada	Accession	10 December 1990
63. Guatemala	20 December 1988	28 February 1991
64. Guinea	Accession	27 December 1990
65. Guyana	Accession	19 March 1993

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
66. Haiti	Accession	18 September 1995
67. Honduras	20 December 1988	11 December 1991
68. Hungary	22 August 1989	15 November 1996
69. Iceland	Accession	2 September 1997
70. India	Accession	27 March 1990
71. Indonesia	27 March 1989	23 February 1999
72. Iran	20 December 1988	7 December 1992
73. Iraq	Accession	22 July 1998
74. Ireland	14 December 1989	3 September 1996
75. Israel	20 December 1988	20 May 2002
76. Italy	20 December 1988	31 December 1990
77. Jamaica	2 October 1989	29 December 1995
78. Japan	19 December 1989	12 June 1992
79. Jordan	20 December 1988	16 April 1990
80. Kazakhstan	Accession	29 April 1997
81. Kenya	Accession	19 October 1992
82. Korea	Accession	28 December 1998
83. Kuwait	2 October 1989	3 November 2000
84. Kyrgyzstan	Accession	7 October 1994
85. Latvia	Accession	24 February 1994
86. Lebanon	Accession	11 March 1996
87. Lesotho	Accession	28 March 1995
88. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Accession	22 July 1996
89. Lithuania	Accession	8 June 1998
90. Luxembourg	26 September 1989	29 April 1992
91. Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Rep.	Accession	18 October 1993
92. Madagascar	Accession	12 March 1991
93. Malawi	Accession	12 October 1995
94. Malaysia	20 December 1988	11 May 1993
95. Maldives	5 December 1989	7 December 2000
96. Mali	Accession	31 October 1995
97. Malta	Accession	28 February 1996
98. Mauritania	Accession	1 July 1993
99. Mauritius	20 December 1988	6 March 2001

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
100. Mexico	16 February 1989	11 April 1990
101. Moldova	Accession	19 February 1995
102. Monaco	24 February 1989	23 April 1991
103. Morocco	28 December 1988	28 October 1992
104. Mozambique	Accession	8 June 1998
105. Nepal	Accession	24 July 1991
106. Netherlands	18 January 1992	8 September 1993
107. New Zealand	18 December 1989	16 December 2002
108. Nicaragua	20 December 1988	4 May 1990
109. Niger	Accession	10 November 1992
110. Nigeria	1 March 1989	1 November 1989
111. Norway	20 December 1988	1 January 1994
112. Oman	Accession	15 March 1991
113. Pakistan	20 December 1988	25 October 1991
114. Panama	20 December 1988	13 January 1994
115. Paraguay	20 December 1988	23 August 1990
116. Peru	20 December 1988	16 January 1992
117. Philippines	20 December 1988	7 June 1996
118. Poland	6 March 1989	26 May 1994
119. Portugal	13 December 1989	3 December 1991
120. Qatar	Accession	4 May 1990
121. Romania	Accession	21 January 1993
122. Russia	19 January 1989	17 December 1990
123. Rwanda	Accession	13 May 2002
124. St. Kitts and Nevis	Accession	19 April 1995
125. St. Lucia	Accession	21 August 1995
126. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Accession	17 May 1994
127. San Marino	Accession	10 October 2000
128. Sao Tome and Principe	Accession	20 June 1996
129. Saudi Arabia	Accession	9 January 1992
130. Senegal	20 December 1988	27 November 1989
131. Seychelles	Accession	27 February 1992
132. Sierra Leone	9 June 1989	6 June 1994
133. Singapore	Accession	23 October 1997

Country	Date Signed	Date Became a Party
134. Slovakia	Succession	28 May 1993
135. Slovenia	Succession	6 July 1992
136. South Africa	Accession	14 December 1998
137. Spain	20 December 1988	13 August 1990
138. Sri Lanka	Accession	6 June 1991
139. Sudan	30 January 1989	19 November 1993
140. Suriname	20 December 1988	28 October 1992
141. Swaziland	Accession	3 October 95
142. Sweden	20 December 1988	22 July 1991
143. Syria	Accession	3 September 1991
144. Tajikistan	Accession	6 May 1996
145. Thailand	Accession	3 May 2002
146. Tanzania	20 December 1988	17 April 1996
147. Togo	3 August 1989	1 August 1990
148. Tonga	Accession	29 April 1996
149. Trinidad and Tobago	7 December 1989	17 February 1995
150. Tunisia	19 December 1989	20 September 1990
151. Turkey	20 December 1988	2 April 1996
152. Turkmenistan	Accession	21 February 1996
153. UAE	Accession	12 April 1990
154. Uganda	Accession	20 August 1990
155. Ukraine	16 March 1989	28 August 1991
156. United Kingdom	20 December 1988	28 June 1991
157. United States	20 December 1988	20 February 1990
158. Uruguay	19 December 1989	10 March 1995
159. Uzbekistan	Accession	14 August 1995
160. Venezuela	20 December 1988	16 July 1991
161. Vietnam	Accession	4 November 1997
162. Yemen	20 December 1988	25 March 1996
163. Yugoslavia	20 December 1988	3 January 1991
164. Zambia	9 February 1989	28 May 1993
165. Zimbabwe	Accession	30 July 1993

<b>Signed but Pending Ratification</b>		
1. Gabon	20 December 1989	
2. Holy See	20 December 1988	Not UN member
3. Mauritius	20 December 1988	
4. Philippines	20 December 1988	
5. Switzerland	16 November 1989	Not UN member
6. Zaire	20 December 1988	

<b>Other</b>		
1. Anguilla		Not UN member
2. Aruba		Not UN member
3. Bermuda		
4. BVI		Not UN member
5. Cambodia		
6. Central African Republic		
7. Chad		
8. Congo		
9. Djibouti		
10. DPR Korea		
11. Hong Kong		Not UN member
12. Laos		
13. Liberia		
14. Liechtenstein		
15. Marshall Islands		
16. Micronesia, Federated States of		
17. Mongolia		
18. Namibia		
19. Papua New Guinea		
20. Samoa		
21. Sao Tome and Principe		
22. Taiwan		Not UN member
23. Turks & Caicos		Not UN member
24. Vanuatu		